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1. Introduction
Suppose you accepted, upon request by a friend of yours, to be a director of
a corporation, and your name appears as a director on the commercial
registry. Suppose, however, the corporation does not take the steps necessary
to elect you a director and you never engage in managing the corporation. The
corporation, run by your friend, next falls into insolvency due to his mis-
management. A creditor of the corporation then brings an action for damages
against you in order to recover the loss sustained by him, due to the
corporation's inability to satisfy his claim. Are you liable in a case like this
under the law of your jurisdiction? In many countries, probably not. Under
Japanese law, by contrast, you will be held liable for such damages.
In K.K. Nippon Sutadeo v. Nakamura [1], a non-party, Itoh, had persuaded
his mother-in-law, Nakamura, to be a representative director of K.K. Tempada.
Nakamura's name was placed on the commercial registry as a director and
representative director of the corporation [2]. However, neither the shareholder
meeting nor the meeting of the board of directors was held to appoint
Nakamura director and representative director of Temp~dS. Nakamura never
participated in the management of the corporation, having been asked merely
to be a nominal representative director, and also having been assured by Itoh
that this would not involve her in any trouble. As its manager, Itoh adminis-
tered all the affairs of Temp8d6 at his will. Yet he was also a representative
director of another corporation, Chiba Sangy6 K.K., to which he had Tempd6
lend 50 million yen. Due to Chiba Sangy8's insolvency, Temp6d8 also became
insolvent. Temp6d6 owed plaintiff approximately 1.4 million yen for the work
done by plaintiff in producing a commercial film for Temp~db. Being unable
to collect the claim from Tempbdb, the plaintiff sought damages from
Nakamura. The plaintiff won at both the first and second instances, and the
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's decisions.
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The Supreme Court conceded that defendant Nakamura was not a director
of Tempbd8; nonetheless, the Court held that Nakamura was liable for her
failure to discharge a director's duty. In reaching this conclusion, the Court
relied on two statutory provisions. The first provision was Article 14 of the
Commercial Code, which provides as follows: "One who, knowingly or by
fault, had an untrue matter registered may not claim as against bona fide third
parties that the matter it not true." This provision refers to the person who is
obligated to apply for registration of certain matters; in Nakamura, this
"person" was the corporation itself, Temp~db. The Court applied the provi-
sion by analogy to Nakamura on the ground that she helped cause the untrue
registration by virtue of her consent to be a director. Accordingly, Nakamura
was stopped from claiming that she was not a director as against a plaintiff
who was not aware of her true status.
The second basis relied on by the Supreme Court was Article 266-3
paragraph 1, of the Commercial Code, which states: "Where a director
committed bad faith or gross negligence in performing the function, the
director is jointly liable for damages also as against third parties" [3]. The
Court did not specify Nakamura's misconduct, but merely stated that she was
liable under such factual situations as found by the court below. The Tokyo
High Court regarded it as the ground for Nakamura's liability that she did
nothing to check Itoh's careless mismanagement.
The combination of these two statutory constructions resulted in imposing
seemingly harsh liability upon a non-director vis-h-vis third parties. The Court
created entirely new law in this respect. Many readers may feel uneasy with
this result. As will be discussed below, although the decision has been
criticized, most commentators support at least the Court's conclusion. This
academic support is natural in light of certain backgrounds that have devel-
oped under Japanese law.
2. Backgrounds
2.1. Bubble Corporations
More than one million stock corporations presently exist in Japan, most of
which are quite small. The fact that there is no statutory requirement for the
minimum amount of stated capital may contribute to the popularity of the
stock corporation form among small enterprises [4]. Not a negligible number
of enterprises operate a business of substantial size by means of borrowed
money. Thus, people often enter into transactions with these small enterprises,
relying on the one person who runs the corporation. In the event of a
corporate failure, creditors are prone to seek recovery from such person.
Where the person has dominated the corporation, the doctrine of disregarding
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the corporate entity may be a powerful weapon [5]. Problems arise, however, if
the dominating person is also insolvent or his or her whereabouts are un-
known. The statutory provision often resorted to in such an instance is Article
266-3 of the Commercial Code, which is applicable to all directors, regardless
whether they are dominant or subordinate, or even nominal.
2.2. Director's Liability Vis-ii-vis Third Parties
Article 266-3 of the Commercial Code is one of the provisions under which
the largest number of cases have accumulated within the area of corporation
law in recent Japan. In pre-war times the predecessors of the provision, Article
177 paragraph 2 of the Commercial Code (before 1938) and Article 266
amendments (before 1950) was applied to those cases where the director
caused damage to the corporation through misconduct, such as appropriation
of funds and resultant corporate loss that led to a creditor's inability to collect
from the corporation [6].
Post-war cases extended the range of Article 266-3 beyond the classic types.
Courts no longer care whether the corporation suffers a loss as a result of the
director's misconduct, and they hold a director liable vis-A-vis third parties to
the extent that the director has acted in bad faith or with gross negligence in
connection with administering corporate affairs. For instance, where a director
makes a promissory note on behalf of the corporation when he has doubt
about the corporation's financial ability to honor the note, the director is held
liable for damages as against the holder of the dishonored note [7].
In cases of this sort, the corporation itself does not suffer a loss as a direct
result of the director's misconduct, aside from damage to its reputation, since
the corporation receives something valuable in exchange for the dishonored
note. Some commentators argue that "bad faith or gross negligence," as
stipulated in Article 266-3, relates to the director's unlawful act directly
addressed to the third-party victim, because the director's conduct - e.g.,
making a note - does not amount to mismanagement. This analysis has led to
two opposing views: (1) Article 266-3 is applicable only where a director
injures a third party without causing damage to the corporation - in other
words, the article is nothing but a special provision of tort law; (2) Article
266-3 applies only to classic cases where a third party suffers loss as a result of
corporate insolvency caused by the director's mismanagement, in other words,
the Article is a special provision for creditors' subrogation, with the redress of
direct unlawful acts by directors being left to the application of general tort
provisions [8].
In Izuo Kbzai K.K. v. Mutoh [9], however, the Supreme Court, by its Grand
Bench decision, held: first, Article 266-3 is applicable to both those situations
irrespective whether there was an intermediate cause of corporate damage;
secondly, "bad faith or gross negligence" relates to malperformance of the
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directorial function; and thirdly, the Article is to be regarded as a statutory
provision sui generis, not a special provision of tort law. This view is now
supported by most academic commentators.
2.3. Liability for Nonperformance: Nominal Directors
In Mutoh, the defendant was a busy man engaged as a patent adviser,
veterinarian, and member of a prefectural assembly. He had been asked by a
K6ketsu to be a representative director of Kikusui K6gy6 K.K. for the
purpose of heightening the corporation's reputation. In contrast to the facts of
Nakamura [10], Mutoh was duly elected a director and a representative
director. He visited the office of Kikusui K6gy6 only a few times during his
directorship of several months, as he was allowed by K~ketsu to abstain from
performing a director's duty. K8ketsu, also a representative director, adminis-
tered all the business of Kikusui Kbgy8 at his will. The corporation purchased
some steel products from the plaintiff and made a promissory note for the
payment thereof. The note was dishonored, and the plaintiff brought an action
for damages against Mutoh and K6ketsu. At both the first and second
instances, the two defendants were held liable. Mutoh alone made jbkoku
appeal to Supreme Court. According to the Court, Mutoh, as a representative
director, was obligated to prevent another representative director, K6ketsu,
from committing grossly negligent managerial acts, e.g., making a note without
the prospect of its being honored when due. Mutoh's failure to meet this
obligation by letting K~ketsu administer every affair of the corporation
constituted Mutoh's own gross negligence.
The duty to supervise the management and to prevent the management
from engaging in mismanagement is owed not only by a representative
director but also by all directors. Thus, although a mere director who is not a
representative director has neither the power nor duty to carry out corporate
business, such a director is empowered to convene a meeting of the board in
order to prevent or correct mismanagement by warning or even removing the
representative director. Failure to act under such circumstances would amount
to the director's breach of his or her duty and may make the director liable for
the management's misconduct which is detrimental to third parties [11].
The director may well be held liable if he or she fails to take any steps while
cognizant of the management's misconduct. If the director is unaware of the
misconduct, how can he or she be motivated to take a step necessary to
prevent it? The fact that the director is only nominal and fails to discharge any
duty as a director constitutes a grossly negligent breach of his or her duty and
may trigger application of Article 266-3.
Why then does one take a position as a nominal director? One may answer,
because of one's highly regarded reputation, to be a decoration of the
corporation. Such a request would not be easy to refuse if made by an intimate
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friend. Renumeration may be attractive in some cases. With regard to small
enterprises, the minimum number of three directors required by the statute for
a stock corporation may also give rise to the use of inactive directors. Many
small corporations are sole proprietorships in reality. Thus, the founder wishes
to and does run the business without the help or supervision of others.
Consequently, a minimum number of directors are necessary only for the
purpose of taking the form of a stock corporation [12]. It may be wise for a
nominal director, in such -a case, to stay inactive in order to keep good
relations with the founder.
Once an enterprise, however small it may be, has taken the form of a stock
corporation, it is no doubt obliged to abide by the provisions of corporation
statutes. Once the position of director is assumed, the duty of the director
must be discharged, no matter what the founder actually expects from the
nominal director. The fact that the director has no experience in the business,
that he or she does not fit well into the position, or that he or she is too busy
to work for the corporation should be the reason for him or her to decline to
be a director, but it cannot be an excuse for failure to fulfill a director's duty.
Even though one may generally be held liable for abstention from perfor-
ming a director's function on the ground that he or she has agreed to assume
the office, the issue remains whether it is reasonable to distinguish cases like
Nakamura only because they have lacked formal procedures to appoint
directors.
3. Liability of Ostensible Directors
3.1. Nominal or Ostensible
For the sake of brevity, it will be convenient to use the following defini-
tions: a "nominal" director means a director duly elected but with an
understanding, like Mutoh's, not to perform a director's function whereas an
"ostensible" director refers to a person who, like Nakamura, has agreed to be
a director and appears on the commercial registry but does not hold the
position of a director. The critical difference between the two terms is that a
nominal director is a director in the legal sense (de jure director), whereas an
ostensible director is not a director. On the other hand, the two terms are alike
in that both nominal and ostensible directors have agreed to be directors, that
both appear as directors on the commercial registry, and that both do not
actually work as directors.
The term "ostensible director" is not limited to application to a person like
Nakamura who has never been elected a director. It also embraces a person
who was a de jure director and whose name continues to appear on the
commercial registry after retirement.
449
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3.2. Liability of a Non-director
One of the criticisms of Nakatnura is based on the distinction that an
ostensible director has neither the power nor duty of a director. Even if
Nakamura had been aware of Itoh's misconduct, she had no means to prevent
or correct it. Thus, Nakamura had no duty to monitor Itoh's conduct and the
failure to prevent the latter's misconduct could not constitute a breach of duty
[13]. In its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that, as a result of untrue
registration brought about by Nakamura's acceptance, she was stopped from
denying that she was a director. Consequently, she was to be treated as if she
had been a director.
3.3. De Facto Director?
There are cases where the conduct of a non-director is legally assessed as a
director's conduct by virtue of the doctrine of de facto director. Under the de
facto director rule, the effect of the non-director's conduct is attributed to the
corporation. Japanese law has developed several principles to protect bonafide
third parties by affirming the validity of a transaction made by a non-director.
For instance, if the resolution of a shareholder meeting electing a person to be
a director is revoked due to, say, a procedural defect, the person is deemed not
to have been a director from the outset. A non-director cannot be a repre-
sentative director. The transaction the person made as a representative direc-
tor on behalf of the corporation before such revocation, however, remains
valid without being affected by the revocation. This construction derives from
applying Article 14 of the Commercial Code, the provision with regard to
untrue registration.
Another device to protect bona fide third parties is application by analogy
of Article 262 of the Commercial Code on an apparent representative director
to a non-director. Article 262 stipulates as follows:
The corporation shall be liable vis-h-vis bonafide third parties for the conduct made
by a director to whom the corporation has conferred a title regarded as implying the
power to represent the corporation such as president, vice-president, senior manag-
ing director or managing director, even where the director did not have the power to
represent the corporation [14].
A literal interpretation of Article 262 precludes applying the provision to a
non-director. The Supreme Court, however, applied the provision by analogy
to a transaction made by an employee who was allowed to call himself a
managing director, and held that the corporation was bound by the transac-
tion [15].
At any rate, these techniques are used to hold the corporation liable for the
conduct made by a non-director. It would not be unreasonable to make use of
the de facto director concept for the purpose of holding the actor liable. For
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example, where a person who has never been elected a director or who has
already retired commits an act to the detriment of third parties in connection
with managing the corporation, the person may be held liable under Article
266-3, on the ground that he at one time was, and therefore exercised the
power of, a director [16].
Where, however, the person has never acted as a director [17], it would be
difficult to embrace him within the concept of de facto director. Nonetheless,
taking into consideration the vital importance of commercial registration
under Japanese law, one commentator has extended the notion of de facto
director to include those who do nothing but give consent to appear on the
commercial registry as a director [181. Yet insofar as it is necessary to resort to
the commercial registration, it seems to be a mere semantic question whether
to call such a person a de facto director.
3.4. Only Bona Fide Third Parties?
One may argue that Article 266-3 imposes liability on the basis of director
status rather than for the purpose of protecting bona fide third parties, and
that it makes no sense from the third party's viewpoint to question whether the
director was duly elected or not. This argument leads to the assertion that
third parties should be allowed to utilize Article 266-3, no matter whether they
are aware of the fact that the director was not duly elected [19].
Although it is true that Article 266-3 is a provision for liability sui generis,
or special tort liability, by no means does it provide for contractual liability.
To the extent that this provision is concerned, it does not matter whether the
third party relied on the director's status. That is why it sounds awkward to
apply this provision via Article 14, which purports to protect those who relied
on an untrue registration.
In order to avoid resorting to the application of Article 14, one commenta-
tor has suggested another provision to hold an ostensible director liable,
Article 266-3 paragraph 2, which stipulates as follows:
A director shall also be liable as provided by the preceding paragraph where the
director made a false entry with respect to material items to be stated in a stock
subscription form, a warrant, a debenture subscription form, a prospectus or
documents prescribed in article 281 paragraph 1 (financial statements), or caused a
false registration or public announcement; Provided, however, that the director shall
not be liable if he or she proves that he or she did not fail to take due care in
making such entry or in causing such registration or public announcement 120].
This provision also refers to a director duly elected. According to the commen-
tator, an ostensible director would be subject to application by analogy of this
provision by virtue of his or her consent to be registered as a director [21].
Thus only those third parties who relied on the false registration may assert
the applicability of this provision, since, otherwise, a causal relationship could
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not be found between the false registration and the harm to the third party
[22].
It would be unfair to grant relief to a third party who was aware that the
defendant was not a director [23]. For the third party entered into a transac-
tion with the corporation, not with a director. The third party only seeks
recovery from persons other than the party to the transaction because of its
inability to collect from the corporation. In this light, the third party should
not be allowed to regard a person as director despite the third party's
awareness that the person was not a director.
On the other hand, it would be too narrow a construction to limit relief to
only those third parties who inspected the commercial register. Article 266-3
paragraph 2 does not demand such a narrow interpretation. As for a prospec-
tus, for instance, even those who have not read it are entitled to seek damages
on account of a material misstatement in it, to the extent that they relied on
the misinformation derived from the prospectus. With regard to Article 14, the
prevailing view is that those who have not inspected the commercial register
also enjoy protection afforded by the provision, to the extent that they were
not aware that the registration was untrue [24].
4. Conclusion
The construction developed by the Supreme Court in Nakamura seems
more persuasive than other theories of construction proposed by commenta-
tors. At first glance, the combination of Commercial Code Article 14 and
Commercial Code Article 266-3 paragraph 1 seems strange. Nevertheless, the
law created by the Court comports with the reality of the Japanese economy.
The legal status of a nominal director resembles that of a surety or guarantor
for the corporation, as a result of accumulated cases that widely apply Article
266-3 paragraph 1. Third parties are right to look for such a guarantor after
the occurrence of corporate insolvency. It would also be logical for third
parties to look for a person who is estopped from denying his or her own
directorship on the ground that the position is almost equivalent to a surety-
ship. Yet in doing so, third parties themselves must be free from self-con-
tradiction, i.e., they should not be able to contend that a person was a director
who they knew was not. In other words, only those who were not aware that
the registration was untrue should be allowed to use the fact of the untrue
registration in their claim for recovery.
To lend one's name to a corporation's list of directors thus is quite risky
under Japanese corporation law. The mere appearance of one's name as a
director on the commercial registry may expose one to liabilities vis-h-vis
unknown people. Yet there are ways to reduce the possibility of liability. For
instance, a person should decline to give consent to be a director when that
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person is not expected to act as such. After agreeing to assume the office of a
director, one should be sure to be duly elected, and then make full use of the
power of a director in order to prevent or correct mismanagement by fellow
directors. As soon as one resigns from a director's position, that person should
make sure that his or her name no longer appears on the commercial registry.
As long as one firmly requests that the management delete the person's name
from the registry, that person will be safe even in relation to bona fide third
parties.
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